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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, Ms. Youmans was convicted of burglary, attempted burglary
and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. At sentencing, the district
court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, for the burglary,
and five years, with three years fixed for the attempted burglary, and retained
jurisdiction over Ms. Youmans. Ms. Youmans was subsequently placed on probation
for ten years.

On appeal, Ms. Youmans asserts:

(1) the district court abused its

discretion by admitting the testimony of Officer Kip Paporello regarding the identification
of the pills found on Ms. Youmans, due to the State’s failure to lay a proper foundation
for the testimony; (2) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Ms. Youmans possessed a controlled substance without a valid prescription; (3) the
district court abused its discretion by imposing unified sentences of ten years with three
years fixed and five years, with three years fixed, upon Ms. Youmans, for her
convictions for burglary and attempted burglary; and (4) the district court was without
jurisdiction to make any factual findings related to the prosecutorial misconduct alleged
in the Notice of Appeal, after Ms. Youmans timely appealed to this Court.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In August of 2013, Ms. Youmans was charged with burglary, attempted burglary,
misdemeanor resisting and obstructing, and misdemeanor possession of a controlled
substance. (R., pp.59-60.) The felony charges alleged that Ms. Youmans entered
apartments at the Garden Plaza of Valley View with the intent to commit a theft inside.
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(R., p.60.) In April of 2014, the State filed an Amended Information, striking Count III,
the misdemeanor charge for resisting and obstructing a police officer. (R., pp.156-157.)
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to compel “the State to produce a
complete unedited copy of the surveillance video which it has offered and which it will
rely on as part of its case in chief.” (R., p.115.) The State objected to Ms. Youmans
motion to compel asserting that it has “made available to the Defendant, the entire
surveillance videos from April and May 2013” and “[a]s of the writing of this response,
counsel for the Defendant has not scheduled an appointment to view the video
surveillance located at the Garden Plaza.”

(R., pp.125-128.)

At the April 8, 2014

hearing on the motion to compel, the State indicated that it would make a copy of the
surveillance video from December 2012 to May of 2013 and the attorney for
Ms. Youmans indicated that would be sufficient. (4/8/14 Tr., p.9, L.4 – p.11, L.22.) At a
hearing on May 5, 2014, defense counsel for Ms. Youmans made a motion to continue
the jury trial, indicating that it was the intention of the defense to have its IT guy make a
copy of the hard drive that contains the surveillance video of the Garden Plaza. (4/8/14
Tr., p.60, Ls.10-25.)
Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial on September 9, 2014 and Ms. Youmans
was ultimately found guilty on all three counts: burglary, attempted burglary, and
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.212-221, 259-261.) The
district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, for the
burglary, and five years, with three years fixed for the attempted burglary, and retained
jurisdiction over Ms. Youmans.

(R., pp.265-268.)

On December 15, 2014,

Ms. Youmans filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district’s Judgment of Conviction
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and Sentence. (R., pp.271-273.) In the Notice of Appeal, defense counsel listed as one
of four potential issues on appeal: “Did the State withhold the computer hard drive
evidence and not allow defense counsel full access to it after multiple attempts?”
(R., p.272.)

Thereafter, on April 27, 2015, the State Appellate Public Defender

(“SAPD”) filed an Amended Notice of Appeal wherein it parroted the potential issues
identified by trial counsel in the previously filed Notice of Appeal, including the issue
related to the computer hard drive. (R., pp.277-280.)
At the April 27, 2015 rider reviewing hearing, the district court placed
Ms. Youmans on probation for ten years. (4/8/14 Tr., p.112, Ls.6-15.) At the same
hearing, requested another later hearing “clarify the underlying record [with regard to] all
the efforts we did make to make that information available to – to show that that was a –
it’s a baseless claim in the Notice of Appeal.” (4/8/14 Tr., p.107, Ls.4-14.) The district
court noted: “it’s an unusual request, and I’m not sure that I even have jurisdiction to
consider it.” (4/8/14 Tr., p.107, L.24 – p.108, L.1.) The district court then issued its
Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation. (R., pp.283-288.)
On June 19, 2015, the State filed a Memorandum in Response to Discovery
Allegations and attached four exhibits, including an affidavits of Charles Faylor, Kip
Paporello, and James Lordieri. (R., pp.290-311.) On July 7, 2015, the district court
held a hearing at the State’s request on its previously filed memorandum. (R., p.314.)
At the hearing, the SAPD questioned whether the district court had jurisdiction to
consider the State’s request to reopen the evidentiary portion of the case and argued
that the “case law is pretty clear that [the district court] can’t supplement the record after
the notice of appeal has been filed for further factual findings.” (7/7/15 Tr., p.4, Ls.2-10,
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p.5, Ls.4-8.) The SAPD then filed an Objection to State’s Memorandum in Response to
Discovery Allegations. (R., pp.315-319.) Following a second hearing, the district court
concluded that it did have jurisdiction to make additional findings related to the
underlying case after the notice of appeal had been filed and entered and Order
Granting Motion to Supplement the Record. (R., pp.335-342.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony of Officer Kip
Paporello regarding the identification of the pills found on Ms. Youmans, due to
the State’s failure to lay a proper foundation for the testimony?

2.

Was there insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Ms. Youmans possessed a controlled substance without a valid prescription?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing unified sentences of ten
years, with three years fixed and five years, with two years fixed fixed, upon
Ms. Youmans convictions for burglary and attempted burglary, to be served
concurrently, in light of the mitigating factors present in the case?

4.

Was the district court without jurisdiction to make any factual findings related to
the prosecutorial misconduct alleged in the Notice of Appeal after Ms. Youmans
timely appealed to this Court?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting The Testimony Of Officer Kip
Paporello Regarding The Identification Of The Pills Found On Ms. Youmans, Due To
The State’s Failure To Lay A Proper Foundation For The Testimony
A.

Introduction
Ms. Youmans was charged with misdemeanor possession of a controlled

substance wherein the State alleged she possessed 17 Hydrocodone pills. Rather than
submit the sized pills to the laboratory for testing, the State offered the testimony of
Officer Paporello who used an unknown online resource to identify the pills as
Hydrocodone.

Ms. Youmans’ foundational objection to the admission of Officer

Paporello’s testimony was overruled.
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting The Testimony Of Officer
Kip Paporello Regarding The Identification Of The Pills Found On Ms. Youmans,
Due To The State’s Failure To Lay A Proper Foundation For The Testimony
1.

The State Failed To Meet The Foundational Requirements For Officer
Paporello’s Testimony Regarding Identification Of The Pills Found In
Ms. Youmans’ Purse

Ms. Youmans was charged with misdemeanor possession of a controlled
substance wherein the State alleged that Ms. Youmans committed the offense by
being in the possession of Hydrocodone, a Schedule III controlled substance.
(R., pp.57-58.) The charges stem from Ms. Youmans’ arrest on a warrant in July of
2013. (Tr., p.433, L.18 – p.437, L.7.)1 During an inventory search of Ms. Youmans’

There are six separately bound transcripts on appeal. For ease of reference, the
bound transcript containing Ms. Youmans’ entry of plea, motion to suppress, jury trial

1
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purse at the jail, 17 loose pills were found in her purse along with a prescription bottle
in her name. (Tr., p.437, L.23 – p.438, L.24.) At trial, Officer Paporello was asked if he
was able to identify what type of pill was found in her purse and defense counsel for
Ms. Youmans made an objection for insufficient foundation. (Tr., p.440, Ls.5-9.) The
district then permitted the State to provide more foundation.

(Tr., p.440, Ls.9-13.)

Officer Paporello testified that he attempted to identify the pill by searching on the
internet. He stated:
what you can do with the application is, you can put in the numbers that
are listed on the pill and anything on either side, you can put that in. It’ll
ask you the shape of the pill, and the color, and some of the applications
do vary a little bit on the information they request.
But then, it will provide you, based on the inscriptions on the pill,
what the pill is. Even pill has its own type of – every type of medication
has its own identifiers.
(Tr., p.441, L.22 – p.442, L.8.) Officer Paporelli then testified that the use of an internet
search to identify a pill was something he knew based on his “training and experience
as a law enforcement officer.” (Tr., p.442, Ls.9-12.) Officer Paporelli also testified that
it was common for other officers to use online resources. (Tr., p.443, Ls.2-11.)
Thereafter, the State again asked the officer as to what he identified the pill as,
and defense counsel again objected, “Judge, I don’t believe that she’s laid enough
foundation to have Officer Paporello explain what kind of pill it is.

He’s not a

pharmacist.” (Tr., p.443, Ls.17-19.) The State responded, “my response is that through
Detective Paporello the State has laid foundation. The identification of a prescription pill
is overly scientific, where an – an expert would be needed to do that. He’s looking at

and sentencing hearing is cited herein as “Tr., p., L..” The remaining bounds transcripts
will be cited with reference to the date of the first hearing contained within the transcript.
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information in an online database that’s commonly used by law enforcement to identify
prescription pills.” (Tr., p.444, Ls.3-9.) The district court then sustained the objection,
finding that the State had failed to show whether law enforcement officers routinely rely
on this information from an online website. (Tr., p.444, Ls.10-16.) Officer Paporello first
acknowledged that he did not recall the name of the internet website he used to reach
the conclusion as to the identity of the pill. (Tr., p.444, Ls.22-25.) The officer then
affirmed that he had previous discussions with “Officer Buzzini about his work with the
DEA and also prescription pills,” but is “not a narcotics officer” and does not work pills
cases very often. (Tr., p.446, Ls.17-21, p.447, Ls.20-25.) Officer Paporello did testify
that officers commonly use internet websites to identify prescription pills in the field.
(Tr., p.446, Ls.11-15.)
Defense counsel for Ms. Youmans continued to object. (Tr., p.448, Ls.12-13.)
The State then argued:
Your Honor, through the testimony of Detective Paporello, he’s testified
that the resource they use, though unidentified, is one that he relies on,
and that in his work with other law enforcement officers . . . Your Honor
heard testimony that he’s primarily assigned to property crimes. But other
law enforcement officers, that do do their work in regard to specifically
prescription pills and their work with the DEA, that they also use online . . .
rely on online resources to identify prescription pills.
(Tr., p.448, Ls.16-25 (emphasis added).) Following the State’s argument, the district
court overruled Ms. Youmans’ objection.

(Tr., p.449, Ls.1-2.)

Thereafter, Officer

Paporello testified that the pills found in Ms. Youmans’ purse were “identified as
Hydroocdone” and was of the strength “5-325 milligram.” (Tr., p.449, Ls.10-15.)
The district court abused its discretion by overruling defense counsel’s objection
and allowing Officer Paporello to identify the purported nature of the pills found in
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Ms. Youmans’ purse.

The trial court has broad discretion in determining the

admissibility of testimonial evidence. State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 225, 232, 786 P.2d
1127, 1134 (1990). A decision to admit or deny such evidence will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a showing of abuse of that discretion. Id. First, it is important to note
that there is nothing in the record to support the premise that Officer Paporello was
identified as a prescription pill expert, or expert of any kind, as required by Idaho
Criminal Rule (“I.C.R.”) 16(b)(7).

(R., pp.22-31, 144-146 (Ms. Youmans’ discovery

requests).) Moreover, even if the State had complied with the mandatory requirements
of I.C.R. 16(b)(7) and disclosed Officer Paporello as an expert for purposes
identification of prescription pills, Officer Paporello would not have met the threshold
requires to testify as an expert witness as he freely admitted he was not a narcotics
officer and rarely handled prescription pill cases. (Tr., p.446, Ls.17-21, p.447, Ls.2025.)
Ms. Youmans acknowledges that “publication by experts should be admitted in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter stated therein if . . . a witness expert in the
subject testifies . . . that the treatise, periodical, or pamphlet is a reliable authority on the
subject.”

State v. Crabb, 107 Idaho 298, 306 (Ct. App. 1984) (quoting Heilman v.

Snyder, 520 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975)).

Thus, even if the State had

provided the required notice and Officer Paporello was qualified to offer an opinion as
the nature of the pills found in the purse, the State failed to specifically identify the
treatise upon which he was relying. Thus, the only testimony before the district court
was that Officer Paporello did a Google search, found an unknown website, and relied
on the hearsay statement on the website to purportedly identify the pills found in
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Ms. Youmans’ purse to be Hydrocodone of the strength “5-325 milligram.” (Tr., p.449,
Ls.10-15.)
As such, the State failed to meet its obligations to provide an adequate
foundation for Officer Paporello’s testimony and the district court abused its discretion in
permitting the jury to hear the inadmissible evidence.
2.

The Error Was Not Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt

“A defendant appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionally-based error
shall have the duty to establish that such an error occurred, at which point the State
shall have the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010). The United States Supreme Court
made it clear that proper harmless error review looks “to the basis on which ‘the jury
actually rested its verdict.’” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (quoting
Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991) (emphasis from Sullivan). As such, the United
States Supreme Court concluded, “[t]he inquiry, in other words, is not whether in a trial
that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered.” Id.
Here, the error certainly affected the jury’s verdict as to the charge of
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. The only evidence that the State
offered to prove that the pills found in Ms. Youmans purse were a controlled substance
was Officer Paporello’s testimony. As such, there was a reasonable possibility the error
contributed to the verdict and as such the State cannot prove beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the error was harmless. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
Likewise, there was a reasonable possibility the error contributed to
Ms. Youmans’ verdict of guilty on both felony offenses. There is no evidence in this
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case that anyone observed Ms. Youmans, who previously worked at Garden Plaza and
still had friends residing in the live center, enter any apartment and take anything.
Rather, the State’s case was built entirely on circumstantial evidence based on videos
of Ms. Youmans visiting the Garden Plaza after her employment had ended. However,
crucial to the State’s case, was the State’s theory the pills found in Ms. Youmans’
possession at the time of her arrest were Hydrocodone, the same type of pills
purportedly missing from a room of one of the Garden Plaza’s residents.

(See

Tr., p.437, L.21 – p.448, L.6, p.449, Ls.10-15, p.453, Ls.453, Ls.15-21.) In fact, the
State highlighted this during its closing argument:
You had testimony from Detective Paporello that she had 17 loose
Hydrocodones in her purse, that they were the . . . 5-325 is what I believe
Detective Paporello testified to, the same that were missing from
Clarence’s room. Detective Paporello told you that they were not in a
prescription bottle.
(Tr., p.706, Ls.2-8 (emphasis added).) Thus, it cannot be said, beyond a reasonable
doubt that the district court’s error in allowing Officer Paporello to identify the mystery
pills found in Ms. Youmans’ possession did not contribute to her convictions for burglary
and attempted burglary.
Accordingly, Ms. Youmans’ convictions for burglary, attempted burglary, and
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance should all be vacated.
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II.
There Is Insufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That
Ms. Youmans Possessed Hydrocodone
A.

Introduction
The only evidence offered at trial to prove that Ms. Youmans possessed

Hydrocodone in violation of I.C. 37-2732(c) was Officer Paporello’s testimony that
based upon an internet search, he identified the pills found in Ms. Youmans’ purse as
being Hydrocodone.

The State failed to offer sufficient foundation to admit Officer

Paporellos testimony and as a matter of law, the reliance on hearsay statements from
an unknown internet website that a purported pill is Hydrocodone does not prove the
issue beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, Ms. Youmans’ conviction for misdemeanor
possession of a controlled substance should be vacated.
B.

There Is Insufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That
Ms. Youmans Possessed Hydrocodone
Ms. Youmans asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict her of

misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. Specifically, the State failed to
offer sufficient evidence that the pills found in Ms. Youmans’ purse were hydrocodone, a
controlled substance.
An accused’s right to demand proof of the State’s case beyond a reasonable
doubt is of “surpassing importance.”
(2000).

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476

The right to demand proof beyond all reasonable doubt is a bedrock

constitutional principle. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (“Although virtually
unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt standard in common-law jurisdictions
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may not conclusively establish it is as a requirement of due process, such adherence
does ‘reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and
justice administered.’” (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968)).
“Simply stated, the fact that defendant is ‘probably’ guilty does not equate with guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Ehlert, 811 N.E.2d 620, 631 (Ill. 2004).
In State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592 (Ct. App. 1997), it was stated that:
[a]ppellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A
judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be overturned
on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable
trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of
proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt . . .
[w]e will not substitute our view for that of the jury as to the credibility of
the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence . . . [m]oreover, we will consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
Id. at 594-595 (citations omitted).
In State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134 (Ct. App. 1997), it was noted that, “[e]vidence
is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in
determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proved.” Id. at 135, 937 P.2d at
961. “The challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is not based on a technical or
subtle defect. The defense simply says that there was not enough admissible evidence
to convict the defendant.” State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877 (Ct. App. 1995).
Here, for the reasons set forth above in section I(B), because the district court
improperly permitted Officer Paporello to testify that the pills found in Ms. Youmans’
purse were Hydrocodone, and the only evidence that the State offered to prove that the
pills found in Ms. Youmans purse were a controlled substance was Officer Paporello’s
testimony, the State failed to prove all the essential elements of misdemeanor
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possession of a controlled substance beyond a reasonable doubt.

As such,

Ms. Youmans’ conviction for that offense should be vacated.
Assuming arguendo, that this Court does conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony, the State has still failed to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the pills found in Ms. Youmans’ purse were a controlled
substance.

As the State candidly conceded during trial, “The identification of a

prescription pill is overly scientific, where an – an expert would be needed to do that.”
(Tr., p.444, Ls.3-9.) There is no evidence in the record that the pills were ever tested by
the State to determine their scientific makeup and the jury certainly did not hear any
such evidence. As such, as the State conceded, it cannot meet its rigorous burden to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance possessed by Ms. Youmans was
in fact a controlled substance based upon an unqualified officer’s testimony on what he
“learned” via an internet search in an area that he is unfamiliar with.

Accordingly,

Ms. Youmans’ conviction for misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance should
be vacated.
III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Ten
Years, With Three Years Fixed, And A Sentence Of Five Years, With Three Years
Fixed, Upon Ms. Youmans’ Convictions For Burglary And Attempted Burglary,
Respectively
A.

Introduction
Ms. Youmans was convicted of burglary, attempted burglary, and misdemeanor

possession of a controlled substance. The district court imposed a unified sentence of
ten years, with three years fixed, for the burglary, and five years, with three years fixed,
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for the attempted burglary, and retained jurisdiction over Ms. Youmans.2 Ms. Youmans
was subsequently placed on probation for ten years. Ms. Youmans asserts that the
district court abused its discretion by failing to withhold judgment over her, or in the
alternative, imposed excessive sentences upon her in light of the mitigating factors
present in her case.
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of
Ten Years, With Three Years Fixed, And A Sentence Of Five Years, With Three
Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Youmans’ Convictions For Burglary And Attempted
Burglary, Respectively
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an

appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court
imposing the sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v.
Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Ms. Ruiz’s sentence
does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 18-3604 (maximum of fourteen
years). Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable,
Ms. Youmans “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460
(2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be
tailored to the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho
445, 483 (2012) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at
sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment: (1)
On appeal, Ms. Youmans does not challenge her sentence for misdemeanor
possession of a controlled substance.

2
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protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public; (3)
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho
122, 132 (2011).
Ms. Youmans asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
withhold judgment in both of her felony cases, or in the alternative, by imposing
excessive sentences upon her in light of the mitigating circumstances present in her
case. At the time the jury verdict in her case, then 49 year old Ms. Youmans had not
previously been charged with, or convicted of a felony offense.

(Presentence

Investigation Report (“PSI”), pp.3, 6-7.);3 see State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673
(1998); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982). The defendant in Hoskins pled guilty to two
counts of drawing a check without funds. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673. In Nice, the
defendant pled guilty to the charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor. Nice,
103 Idaho at 90.

In both Hoskins and Nice, the court considered, among other

important factors, that the defendants had no prior felony convictions. Hoskins, 131
Idaho at 673; Nice, 103 Idaho at 90. Furthermore, the Nice Court found the defendant’s
honorable discharge from the military to be a factor in mitigation of sentence. Id. at 90.
The Hoskins Court ultimately found that based upon the nature of the offense and the

The PSI is contained in the electronic record “Youmans 42795 psi” and is cited herein
as “PSI.”

3
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absence of any prior serious criminal record, the district court abused its discretion in
imposing the sentence. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 675.
Furthermore, Ms. Youmans’ prior convictions consist entirely of misdemeanor
offenses and are directly related to her admitted addiction issues, which, in part, likely
resulted from past injures and her fibromyalgia.

(PSI, pp.6-7, 12.)

Following her

conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol in 2003, Ms. Youmans indicated that
she now only consumes a “couple glasses” of wine on special occasions. (PSI, p.12.)
Ms. Youmans indicated that although she was not initially aware of her problems with
prescription medications, Ms. Youmans now understands that she does have an
addiction to certain pain medications and has expressed the desire to “explore natural
remedies for her pain” upon her release from incarceration. (PSI, p.10; Tr., p.773,
Ls.18-21.) Evidencing her intent to break the cycle of addiction, Ms. Youmans inquired
into a number of outpatient programs and expressed the desire to complete 90
meetings in 90 days in Narcotics Anonymous. (Tr., p.775, Ls.8-22, p.777, Ls.15-20.)
In addition to her lack of prior felony history and understanding of the addiction
issues she has and is facing, Ms. Youmans has the support system in place to meet her
goals of continued sobriety.

As defense counsel noted, Ms. Youmans’ friends and

family were present at sentencing to show their support. (Tr., p.768, Ls.23-25.) In her
PSI, Ms. Youmans wrote that she’s still happily married and that her husband supports
her. (PSI, p.9.) Ms. Youmans also has a great relationship with her four children. (PSI,
p.9.)

In addition, Reverend David Wells wrote that Ms. Youmans has a “caring,

structured family that goes to great lengths over great distances to support one
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another.” (PSI, p.1.) Lee Axelsen, President of Axelsen Concrete Construction, wrote
that Ms. Youmans “is an extremely caring wife, mother, and grandmother.” (PSI, p.4.)
Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, Ms. Youmans asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by failing to withhold judgment in both of her felony cases, or in the
alternative, by imposing excessive sentences upon her.
IV.
The District Court Was Without Jurisdiction To Make Any Factual Findings Related To
The Prosecutorial Misconduct Alleged In The Notice Of Appeal After Ms. Youmans
Timely Appealed To This Court
A.

Introduction
Following the filing of a timely Notice of Appeal and after the district court held a

rider hearing and placed Ms. Youmans’ on probation, the State filed a memorandum
seeking to supplement the record related to a potential claim of prosecutorial
misconduct identified by Ms. Youmans’ trial attorney in the Notice of Appeal.
Ms. Youmans’ objected to the district court’s jurisdiction consider any additional
evidence or to make any additional factual findings related to potential the claim of
misconduct. The district court concluded it did have jurisdiction, considered additional
evidence submitted in the form of affidavit, and supplemented the underlying record in
the instant appeal. Ms. Youmans contends the district court lacked jurisdiction.
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B.

The District Court Was Without Jurisdiction To Make Any Factual Findings
Related To The Prosecutorial Misconduct Alleged In The Notice Of Appeal After
Ms. Youmans Timely Appealed To This Court
On September 11, 2014 Ms. Youmans was convicted of burglary, attempted

burglary, and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance and sentenced for the
same on November 10, 2014. (R., pp.259-261, 264-268.) On December 15, 2014,
Ms. Youmans filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district’s Judgment of Conviction
and Sentence, identifying as a potential issue on appeal: “Did the State withhold the
computer hard drive evidence and not allow defense counsel full access to it after
multiple attempts?” (R., pp.271-273.)
At the April 27, 2015 rider reviewing hearing, the district court placed
Ms. Youmans on probation for ten years. (4/8/14 Tr., p.112, Ls.6-15.) On April 28,
2015 the district court entered its Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation.
(R., pp.283-288.) On June 19, 2015, the State filed a Memorandum in Response to
Discovery Allegations and attached four exhibits, including an affidavits of Charles
Faylor, Kip Paporello, and James Lordieri.

(R., pp.290-311.)

At a hearing on the

State’s memorandum and in a subsequent objection, the SAPD questioned whether the
district court had jurisdiction to consider the State’s request to reopen the evidentiary
portion of the case and argued that the “case law is pretty clear that [the district court]
can’t supplement the record after the notice of appeal has been filed for further factual
findings.” (7/7/15 Tr., p.4, Ls.2-10, p.5, Ls.4-8; R., pp.315-319.) The district court
concluded that it did have jurisdiction to make additional findings related to the
underlying case after the notice of appeal had been filed and entered and Order
Granting Motion to Supplement the Record. (R., pp.335-342.)
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Ms. Youmans asserts that the district court was without jurisdiction to
supplement the record with additional facts and findings following the filing of a timely
Notice of Appeal. Once an appeal was perfected the trial court lost all jurisdiction of the
cause and could not allow amendments or enter a substituted or supplemental order.
See Dolbeer v. Harten, 91 Idaho 141, 147-48 (1966) (relying upon I.C. § 13-208 which
stated that all further proceedings in a lower court are stayed during the pendency of an
appeal (statute repealed in 1977)); see also Syth v. Parke, 121 Idaho 156 (1990) (“For
nearly a century, this Court has followed the general rule that once an appeal is
perfected the trial court is divested of jurisdiction of the cause.”

Id. at 157-58).

However, the adoption of the Idaho Appellate Rules (I.A.R.) in 1977 altered that
tradition. Idaho Appellate Rule 13 maintained that proceedings in the lower court were
stayed during the pendency of an appeal, but granted the trial courts limited jurisdiction
to address specific motions and issues. See I.A.R. 13; see also Syth, 121 Idaho at 158
(recognizing that I.A.R. 13 replaced I.C. § 13-208, retained general rule of stay, but
granted limited jurisdiction); Hells Canyon Excursions, Inc. v. Oakes, 111 Idaho 123
(Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing that the adoption of the court rules granted limited
jurisdiction). Once a notice of appeal is timely filed from a judgment of conviction, a
“district court then lacks authority to enter orders in the case, except as to certain
matters enumerated in [Idaho Appellate] Rule 13(c).” State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522,
524 (Ct. App. 1994).
Whether a discovery violation occurred in the instant case depend upon the
district court’s rulings, counsel’s arguments, and the record created at the trial court
level before the Notice of Appeal was filed. Rather than relying upon the record created
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prior to the filing of the Notice of Appeal, the district court has allowed the State to
supplement the record and court rulings in order to address what it believed would be
an issue raised on appeal.4 However, “[a] trial court may not reconsider or make post
hoc rationalizations of previous rulings once a notice of appeal is filed.” Wade, 125
Idaho at 524. This is, perhaps, why there is no rule or statute which authorizes the
State to supplement the evidence or seek additional findings after a notice of appeal
has been filed. Cf. State v. Wilson, 138 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding that I.A.R.
13(c)(10) allows a trial court to rule on motions “authorized by law,” such as a motion
authorized to be filed by court rule).
Accordingly, because the district court was without jurisdiction to consider
additional evidence and supplement the record this case, this Court should strike form
the record all of the State’s legal filings related to this issue from the date of
Ms. Youmans’ December 15, 2014 Notice of Appeal and all evidence offered and
findings made by the district court should not be considered by any court in any future
proceedings related to this case.

It should be noted that Ms. Youmans has not raised on appeal the question of whether
the State withheld the computer hard drive evidence and denied defense counsel
access to the same. This of course raises the question of whether the Ada County
Prosecutor’s Office has any standing, or a cognizable legal interest, to now be a party in
the instant appeal. The SAPD acknowledges that filed a Notice of Non-Objection to the
Ada County Prosecutor’s Office’s initial participation in the instant appeal.

4
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Youmans respectfully requests that this Court vacate her convictions for
burglary, attempted burglary, and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance.
Alternatively, Ms. Youmans requests that this Court vacate her sentences and remand
the case to the district court with instructions that it withhold judgment over her.
Alternatively, Ms. Youmans requests that this Court reduce her sentences as it deems
appropriate. Additionally, Ms. Youmans requests that this Court strike all filing by the
State, any additional evidence offered, and all findings by the district court related to
the potential claim that the State withheld the computer hard drive in this case and/or
denied her defense counsel access to the same.
DATED this 8th day of March, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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